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In January 1917, a group of women led by Alice Paul began a two-
and-a-half year protest in support of women’s suffrage.1 As the first 
activists to ever picket the White House,2 these women became known as 
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 1. DORIS STEVENS, JAILED FOR FREEDOM: AMERICAN WOMEN WIN THE VOTE 21, 59 (Carol 
O’Hare ed., 1995). 
 2. Id. 
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the “Silent Sentinels” for their practice of standing in peaceful silence 
while holding banners displaying “provocative political slogans or 
demanding the right to vote.”3 While President Woodrow Wilson initially 
appeared “amused and interested”4 in the women’s protest, even ordering 
the White House guards to “invite them for a cup of coffee,”5 the White 
House’s toleration of the picketers diminished after the United States 
entered World War I in April 1917.6 Shortly thereafter, the peaceful nature 
of the Silent Sentinels’ protest changed. This change came to fruition  
not because of any actions taken by the women; rather, local police,  
with implicit support from the White House, began “arresting and  
jailing picketers for disorderly conduct and obstructing sidewalk traffic, 
even though they were doing nothing differently than they had for the  
past six months.”7 
While the first arrests led to little time in prison, the Silent Sentinels’ 
persistence in continuing the protests in the face of arrest eventually led to 
terms of incarceration.8 By October 1917, District of Columbia police 
officers had arrested at least seventy women, and some women faced terms 
of imprisonment as great as six months.9 For those women facing 
incarceration, the District of Columbia confined them to the District Jail 
and the Occoquan Workhouse in Virginia.10 In both prisons, the women 
continued their protest through a series of non-violent actions, including 
circulating petitions, organizing work strikes, and engaging in hunger 
strikes.11 These group protests called attention not only to the unjust nature 
of the Silent Sentinels’ incarceration but also the squalid and miserable 
conditions of the prisons, including the inedible food, unsanitary cells, 
vermin-infested blankets, and brutal corporal punishment.12 Certainly, the 
 
 3. Lynda G. Dodd, Parades, Pickets, and Prison: Alice Paul and the Virtues of Unruly 
Constitutional Citizenship, 24 J.L. & POL. 339, 398 (2008) (quoting Silent, Silly, Offensive, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1917, at 14). 
 4. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 67. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 67. See infra Section I.B. (providing further detail into how the suffragist movement 
brought unwelcome attention to the Wilson administration during a contentious war period in 
American history). 
 7. SUSAN WARE, WHY THEY MARCHED: UNTOLD STORIES OF THE WOMEN WHO FOUGHT FOR 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE 244 (2019). 
 8. Nicole B. Godfrey, Suffragist Prisoners and the Importance of Protecting Prisoner Protest, 
53 AKRON L. REV. 279, 386-87 (2019). 
 9. WARE, supra note 7, at 245. There are conflicting accounts as to how many women were 
arrested as a result of the picketing movement. Compare id. (noting seventy arrests), with JOHANNA 
NEUMAN, GILDED SUFFRAGISTS: THE NEW YORK SOCIALITES WHO FOUGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHT TO 
VOTE 129 (2017) (noting five hundred arrests). 
 10. See, e.g., WARE, supra note 7, at 246; J.D. ZHANISER & AMELIA R. FRY, ALICE PAUL: 
CLAIMING POWER 282 (2014). 
 11. Dodd, supra note 3, at 411; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 107, 115. 
 12. Godfrey, supra note 8, at 335–36. 
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protests demonstrated the will of the nation’s suffragists to persist in their 
advocacy until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, but the in-
prison protests also drew the attention of federal and District of Columbia 
officials to the conditions in the Occoquan Workhouse and the District of 
Columbia jail.13 While the protests failed to lead to reform of the prisons, 
they did create a small amount of transparency into the workings of the 
institutions that had theretofore been lacking.14 
Unfortunately, transparency in modern prison systems is similarly 
absent, despite the sheer enormity of the modern criminal justice system.15 
The United States incarcerates nearly 2.2 million people today.16 Yet the 
indignities suffered each day by the human beings living in American 
prisons and jails occur largely out of sight from the general public.17 While 
intrepid journalists have published important exposés on modern 
American prison life in recent years,18 the nation’s prisons remain “the 
 
 13. Id. at 336. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the Violence of Incarceration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/inside-amercas-black-box. 
html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/X88Y-FXN6]. 
 16. Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (Apr. 21, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J9WW-X9JH]. 
 17. Dewan, supra note 15; see also Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 
151, 152–53 (2019) (cataloguing the types of indignities suffered by those incarcerated in the modern 
prison system). 
 18. See, e.g., Shane Bauer, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard, MOTHER JONES 
(July/Aug. 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-private-prisons-corrections-
corporation-inmates-investigation-bauer/ [https://perma.cc/AC84-YQLZ] (describing cells that look 
like tombs, guards using force on a prisoner who just had open-heart surgery as “all part of the 
bid’ness,” and the reporters own priorities changing as “[s]triving to treat everyone as human takes 
too much energy”); Mark Binelli, Inside America’s Toughest Federal Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/inside-americas-toughest-federal-prison.html 
[https://perma.cc/U6N7-MLVT] (recounting tales of self-mutilation, psychosis, and suicide at the 
federal supermax where all prisoners are held in solitary confinement); Annie Correal, No Heat for 
Days at a Jail in Brooklyn Where Hundreds of Inmates Are Sick and ‘Frantic,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/nyregion/mdc-brooklyn-jail-heat.html [https://perma.cc 
/69GU-G8JX] (recounting the experience of federal detainees “stuck in freezing cells” with little to 
no power or heat for at least a week); Jennifer Gonnerman, Do Jails Kill People?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 
20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/do-jails-kill-people [https://perma.cc/ 
DQQ3-4CLA] (noting that the well-known New York City jail on Rikers Island “has long been 
notorious for its culture of brutality”); German Lopez, America’s Prisoners Are Going on Strike in at 
Least 17 States, VOX (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-
strike-2018 [https://perma.cc/JFP6-PQBF] (describing the work and hunger strike planned by 
prisoners across the country from August 21 to September 9, 2018); Aviva Stahl, Force-Feeding Is 
Cruel, Painful, and Degrading—and American Prisons Won’t Stop, NATION (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/force-feeding-prison-supermax-torture/ [https://perma.cc/J347-
PJHW] (describing the force-feeding tactics utilized on prisoners engaging in hunger strikes by the 
nation’s federal supermax). 
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black boxes of our society.”19 But, in order to fully understand the 
complexities and true nature of our criminal justice system—in particular, 
the shape and contours of the American form of punishment (i.e., 
incarceration)—the voices and stories of those living inside prison walls 
must be heard.20 
To ensure necessary accountability of those we entrust to incarcerate 
the millions of Americans behind bars, incarcerated voices must be heard 
by not only the public but also by those in power. In 2006, the Commission 
on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons released a report detailing the 
problematic conditions that permeated the nation’s prisons and jails.21 The 
report pointed to the lack of an independent, external monitor of prisons, 
concluding that without such a checking system, prisons are free to operate 
with little accountability or transparency.22 
This lack of accountability is compounded by the fact prison systems 
often punish prisoners who seek to have their voices heard through petition 
or protest.23 For example, in January 2020, three men incarcerated by the 
Michigan Department of Corrections penned an open letter to Michigan 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer and Corrections Department Director Heidi 
Washington, describing abusive treatment and unhealthy conditions at the 
Chippewa Correctional Facility in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.24 Rather 
than take heed of the contents of the letter, the Michigan prison system 
instead issued a disciplinary ticket against at least one of the three men, 
convicting him of “inciting a riot” and placing him in solitary confinement 
 
 19. Dewan, supra note 15. 
 20. See generally Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public 
Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462–66 (2014) (discussing 
problems inherent to the lack of transparency of penal institutions); Laura Rovner, On Litigating 
Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax: Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 
DENV. L. REV. 457, 460–64 (2018) (discussing the invisibility of prisons as compared to other aspects 
of the criminal justice system). 
 21. John J. Gibbons & Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report 
of the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 408–
12 (2006) (“Corrections leaders work hard to oversee their own institutions and hold themselves 
accountable, but their vital efforts are not sufficient and cannot substitute for external forms of 
oversight.”). 
 22. See id. at 408. 
 23. See, e.g., ALBERT WOODFOX, SOLITARY: UNBROKEN BY FOUR DECADES IN SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT. MY STORY OF TRANSFORMATION AND HOPE 278–79 (2019); Paul Egan, U.P. Prison 
Inmate Wrote Complaint About Conditions. Then He Was Moved to Solitary, DET. FREE PRESS (Feb. 
11, 2020), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/02/11/chippewa-correctional-
facility-michigan-prisoner-edward-walton/4721477002/ [https://perma.cc/PEE6-P7EQ]; Joseph 
O’Sullivan, Inmates Sue Washington Corrections Officials After Being Put in Solitary Confinement 
Over Food Strike, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/crime/inmates-sue-washington-corrections-officials-after-being-put-in-solitary-confinement-
over-food-strike/?utm_source=The+Marshall+Project [https://perma.cc/BJ5R-Y7K5]. 
 24. Egan, supra note 23. 
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as punishment.25 To support the conviction, the Michigan Department  
of Corrections found that the prisoner “admitted to writing a letter 
encouraging people on the outside to call the warden and tell her if  
she doesn’t make changes the prisoners want that there will ‘be a  
protest scheduled to take place at this prison to make national attention out 
of the situation.’”26 
This call for protest of conditions and treatment faced by incarcerated 
people follows in the footsteps forged by the Silent Sentinels and their in-
prison protests. But, as will be discussed in further detail below, such 
group petition and protest activities would likely result in similar “inciting 
a riot” charges in almost every modern prison system.27 In large part, the 
proliferation of such scurrilous charges in the regulations governing 
modern prison systems is undoubtedly related to the long-standing 
deference afforded to prison officials by the federal courts and the 
associated curtailment of prisoners’ First Amendment rights that results 
from such deference. 
This Article argues for increased legal protections for prisoners who 
choose to engage in group protest to shed light on the conditions of their 
incarceration. A companion piece to a similar article that focused on 
prisoner free speech rights,28 this Article uses the acts of protest utilized 
by the Silent Sentinels to examine why prisoners’ rights to petition and 
association should be strengthened. By strengthening these rights, the 
Article argues that we will advance the values enshrined by the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause while simultaneously advancing the rights 
of the incarcerated millions with little to no political power. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, Part I provides the 
historical background necessary to understand the utility of the Silent 
Sentinels as an example demonstrating the importance of protecting the 
rights to petition and association for the disenfranchised. From there, Part 
II provides an overview of the doctrinal law associated with prisoners’ 
rights to petition and associate. Part II also discusses the deference to 
prison officials inherent to First Amendment doctrine as applied to 
prisoners. Finally, Part III examines how the activities of the Silent 
Sentinels amount to what almost all prison systems call “inciting a riot” 
under modern prison regulations and argues that such a result is 
inconsistent with the purpose and values of the First Amendment. Part III 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (quoting Corrections Department spokesman Chris Gautz who quoted “a letter Walton 
allegedly sent through the prison email system, known as JPay”). 
 27. See infra Section III.A. 
 28. See Godfrey, supra note 8. 
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concludes by cataloguing examples of modern prison protest and calling 
for more robust protections for such protest. 
I. THE SUFFRAGISTS’ PROTESTS 
By the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century, the fight 
for women’s suffrage in the United States had been raging for more than 
half a century.29 Prior to the Civil War, the Equal Rights Association 
spearheaded the movement with a focus not only on women’s rights but 
also the abolition of slavery.30 By 1869, the Equal Rights Association 
fractured into two “separate, warring camps” that eventually led to the 
formation of two new organizations in 1870.31 The American Woman 
Suffrage Association (AWSA) focused its efforts on securing women’s 
right to vote at the state level.32 In contrast, the National Woman Suffrage 
Association (NWSA) “espoused a radical platform of sweeping social 
change to improve the status of women, and advocated a constitutional 
amendment to guarantee women’s voting rights.”33 
For twenty years, the two organizations advocated for women’s 
rights through divergent methods, but by 1890, the two organizations 
merged to become the National American Woman Suffrage Association 
(NAWSA).34 The NAWSA adopted the more moderate advocacy 
approach championed by the AWSA,35 a move that some scholars claim 
brought the suffrage movement to a standstill in the early 1900s.36 The 
 
 29. When the American movement for women’s suffrage actually began is a matter of debate, 
for “[h]istory is defined less by what happened than by who tells the story.” Sally Roesch Wagner, 
Introduction THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, at xxii (Sally Roesch Wagner ed., 2019). 
Historians often point to the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention as the start to the woman suffrage 
movement, but “it’s also possible that a grade school student going through her local newspaper for a 
History Day project may someday find an account of a woman’s rights meeting held before 1848, 
setting back that beginning marker.” Id. at xxii-xxiii; see also WARE, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that, 
while “[t]he Seneca Falls Convention holds an iconic place in the history of woman suffrage, . . . it 
was not, as is often asserted, the first convention ever held on the question of women’s rights”). 
 30. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 13. 
 31. Id. at 13–14. 
 32. Id. at 14. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Though beyond the scope of this piece, much controversy surrounded the circumstances 
leading up to the merger of the AWSA and NWSA in 1890. See generally THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 
MOVEMENT 314–20 (Sally Roesch Wagner ed., 2019). 
 35. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 15. 
 36. See Sally Roesch Wagner, Afterward to THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 484 (Sally 
Roesch Wagner ed., 2019) (“When the merger favored the AWSA organizational structure, the 
grassroots process of the NWSA was lost. As the NAWSA leadership entrenched power at the top, 
disgruntled suffragists dropped out of the organization, often forming their own. State workers on the 
ground fought the national leadership’s dictating their course of action and withholding money if the 
states didn’t fall into line. Campaigns were disrupted and lost as a result. A grassroots movement had 
been turned into a top-down authoritarian organization worthy of any corporation.”). 
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NAWSA focused on campaigning state-by-state, and despite some early 
successes in Colorado, Idaho, and Utah in the 1890s, “from 1896 to 1910, 
no other state responded to NAWSA’s extensive state campaign work.”37 
Known as the doldrums, “[n]ot a single suffrage victory, state or national, 
was achieved” during this time period.38 All of this began to change during 
the second decade of the twentieth century when Alice Paul returned to 
the United States from Great Britain armed with the lessons she had 
learned from her British counterparts.39 
A. Alice Paul and Lessons Learned from the Suffragettes 
A Quaker by birth, Alice Paul began her advocacy for suffrage rights 
in 1907 after hearing Christabel Pankhurst speak at the University of 
Birmingham in the United Kingdom.40 Leaders of the suffrage cause in 
Great Britain, Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters Christabel and 
Sylvia began “employing a more militant approach to suffrage 
campaigning in 1905.”41 After hearing Christabel’s speech, Ms. Paul 
joined the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU)—the 
organization founded by the Pankhursts.42 With the WSPU, Ms. Paul 
participated in marches and demonstrations with the British suffragettes, 
activities which led to her arrest on seven occasions.43 Three of these 
arrests led to imprisonment where Ms. Paul joined her fellow suffragettes 
in a series of hunger strikes.44 On at least one occasion, prison officials 
force fed the hunger-striking women.45 
While Ms. Paul’s experience with the WPSU no doubt had a 
profound influence on her, she shied away from some of the more militant 
tactics employed by the Pankhursts in England.46 Staying true to her 
 
 37. Dodd, supra note 3, at 361. 
 38. Roesch Wagner, supra note 29. 
 39. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 17. While the focus of this piece is on the protests coordinated and 
led by Alice Paul and the National Women’s Party, I do not mean to suggest that the NAWSA played 
no role in securing the right to vote for women in the United States. Because of the American 
constitutional scheme, the NAWSA’s state-by-state approach undoubtedly contributed to the passage 
and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, which required approval by thirty-six states. Id. at 20; 
see also ELAINE WEISS, THE WOMAN’S HOUR: THE GREAT FIGHT TO WIN THE VOTE 1 (2019); Dodd, 
supra note 3, at 361 (describing NAWSA’s “decentralized, state-by-state campaign for women’s 
suffrage, either by state constitutional amendment or state legislative enactment”). 
 40. See Dodd, supra note 3, at 356. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 356–57. 
 43. Id. at 357. 
 44. Id. at 357–58. 
 45. Id. at 358. 
 46. WEISS, supra note 39, at 62 (describing the Pankhurst “forces” as “attack[ing] shops and 
office windows with hammers, plant[ing] small bombs in postboxes, and set[ting] fire to government 
property”). 
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Quaker background, Ms. Paul’s “militant” tactics never grew more violent 
than “[h]oisting a picket sign, chaining wrists to a fence, and burning 
paper.”47 Nevertheless, Ms. Paul’s tutelage by the Pankhursts provided her 
“invaluable experience in organizing parades, developing a network of 
supporters, opening new local offices, and facing arrest for their 
protests.”48 Ms. Paul brought this experience with her when she returned 
home to the United States in January of 1910.49 
B. The Silent Sentinels’ Protests 
For two years after her return from Europe, Ms. Paul stayed out of 
the American suffrage battle; instead, she focused on her doctoral research 
at the University of Pennsylvania.50 But by 1912, Ms. Paul found herself 
ready to join the American suffragists and “persuaded the staid NAWSA, 
headquartered in New York, to permit her to organize a lobbying arm in 
Washington, D.C. Known as the Congressional Union, its sole purpose 
was to lobby for a federal woman suffrage amendment.”51 For the 
Congressional Union’s first public protest, Ms. Paul chose to organize her 
fellow suffragists in a parade set to occur the day before President 
Woodrow Wilson’s first inauguration in March 1913.52 The parade 
consisted of “some 8,000 college women, professional women, working 
women, and middle-class members of the NAWSA” who marched 
through the streets of the nation’s capital surrounded by the hundreds of 
thousands of people in town for the inauguration.53 While the 
“predominantly male crowd watching the parade as it passed down 
Pennsylvania Avenue jeered, taunted, spat upon, and roughed up the 
women,” the police sat idly by, failing to protect the women.54 
Nonetheless, Ms. Paul viewed the parade as a rousing success, largely 
because of the publicity garnered.55 
In the wake of the parade’s success, Ms. Paul began “intensive 
lobbying campaigns” aimed at garnering support from both the 
Democratic Party-controlled Congress and White House.56 Ms. Paul’s 
tactics, however, began to clash with the NAWSA leadership, leading the 
Congressional Union to withdraw from the NAWSA to form the National 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Dodd, supra note 3, at 358. 
 49. See id. at 359. 
 50. Id. 
 51. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 18. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 18–19. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Women’s Party (NWP) in 1916.57 Shortly after this split, in January 1917, 
the NWP began a two-and-a-half-year protest in support of women’s 
suffrage.58 This protest started outside the White House gates where a 
dozen women gathered carrying purple, white, and gold banners; they 
became the first group of American citizens to ever picket the White 
House.59 Earning the moniker “Silent Sentinels,” the women stood in 
peaceful silence while holding banners with slogans like, “Mr. President, 
what will you do for women’s suffrage?” and “How long must women 
wait for liberty?”60 
For the first several months, the White House picketing lines 
remained largely peaceful.61 President Wilson mostly ignored the 
picketers, merely tipping his hat or smiling at them as he passed on his 
way in and out of the White House.62 As the women persisted in their daily 
protest throughout the winter months, the President ordered the White 
House “guards to invite them for a cup of hot coffee,” an invitation the 
Silent Sentinels declined.63 In all, the President seemed to view the protest 
as “a trifling incident staged by a minority of the radical suffragists” and 
remained “confident in his national power.”64 In effect, he tolerated the 
picketers’ presence but saw no need to change his own political agenda in 
response to the protest. 
President Wilson’s toleration evaporated by April 1917, however, 
when the United States entered World War I.65 While many expected the 
NWP to suspend its picketing campaign in support of the war effort, Ms. 
Paul and other NWP leaders decided to continue their protest because “in 
doing so the organization serve[d] the highest interests of the country.”66 
This decision lost the NWP a sizable portion of its membership, but the 
strategy ultimately succeeded in keeping public attention on the cause of 
suffrage.67 The United States’ war effort also gave the suffragists a new 
advocacy angle: they became determined to highlight the hypocrisy 
inherent in President Wilson’s championing of democracy around the 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 59; see also Rivera Sun, Silent Sentinels Start Suffrage Protest on Jan 10th, 1917, 
RIVERA SUN (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.riverasun.com/silent-sentinels-start-suffrage-protest-on-jan-
10th-1917/ [https://perma.cc/F9A7-MKBX]. 
 61. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 59–66. 
 62. Id. at 61. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 67. 
 66. Dodd, supra note 3 (quoting CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL SUFFRAGE TO EQUAL 
RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY, 1910-1928, at 111–12 (2000)). 
 67. Id. at 401 n.264. 
1122 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1113 
world while denying democratic participation to half of his own citizens.68 
With this goal in mind, the suffragists created new banners meant to 
embarrass President Wilson and his administration. Specifically, the 
suffragists utilized those banners whenever a foreign envoy visited the 
White House.69 This new strategy turned out to be a tipping point that 
would ultimately cause the suffragists to be arrested en masse, an outcome 
that generated even more publicity for the NWP and its cause.70 
On June 20, 1917, the Wilson administration hosted a Russian envoy 
at the White House.71 When the envoy arrived at the White House gates, 
the suffragists stood holding a banner seeking to draw on the sentiments 
espoused during the Russian Revolution.72 The banner read: 
To the Russian Envoys, we the women of America tell you that 
America is not a democracy. Twenty million American women are 
denied the right to vote. President Wilson is the chief opponent of 
their national enfranchisement. Help us make this nation really free. 
Tell our government it must liberate its people before it can claim 
free Russia as an ally.73 
This banner drew the ire of an angry passerby, who tore it down.74 
When the women returned the next day with a similar banner, a group of 
boys destroyed the second banner, too.75 On each day, police officers stood 
idly by, watching the destruction of the banners.76 With these actions, the 
peaceful nature of the Silent Sentinels’ daily protest forever changed. 
On June 22, 1917, two days after the destruction of the first banner, 
“local police, apparently with the tacit support of the Wilson 
administration, started arresting and jailing picketers for disorderly 
conduct and obstructing sidewalk traffic, even though they were doing 
nothing differently than they had for the past six months.”77 Police only 
arrested two picketers on that first day of arrests, and local officials quickly 
dismissed the charges levied against them.78 However, the arrests 
continued over the next several days.79 On June 26, 1917, D.C. officials 
arrested six women for “obstructing the traffic,” tried them, and sentenced 
 
 68. Id. at 400. 
 69. Id.; see also STEVENS, supra note 1, at 74. 
 70. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 73. 
 71. Id. 
 72. WARE, supra note 7, at 244. 
 73. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 74. 
 74. Id.; WARE, supra note 7. 
 75. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 74. 
 76. Id. 
 77. WARE, supra note 7, at 244. 
 78. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 76; Dodd, supra note 3, at 404. 
 79. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 76. 
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them to a $25 fine after returning a guilty verdict.80 When the women 
refused to pay the fine, the court ordered they be incarcerated in the D.C. 
jail for three days.81 Thus began a series of arrests and incarcerations for 
the Silent Sentinels that would last for the next several months, drawing 
critical attention across the nation.82 
C. In-Prison Petitions and Protests 
The first incarcerated Silent Sentinels spent only minimal time in the 
District Jail, but by July 17, 1917, local officials had arrested, tried, 
convicted, and sentenced sixteen picketers to sixty days at the Occoquan 
Workhouse in Virginia.83 The Occoquan Workhouse in Lorton, Virginia, 
is an infamous prison known for its squalid conditions.84 The Women’s 
Workhouse at Occoquan opened in 1912 and confined “poor women of 
color, imprisoned for crimes such as disorderly conduct and prostitution. 
The women of the workhouse did laundry for the facility, while others 
worked in the gardens.”85 The suffragists confined to Occoquan found 
themselves facing horrible conditions.86 Prison officials served the women 
inedible food with worms in it, gave them blankets that had not been 
washed or cleaned for a year, withheld communication from the outside 
world, and subjected them to ruthless forms of punishment, including 
“physical intimidation and violence.”87 The prison superintendent and his 
son meted out particularly brutal punishments, including beating the 
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women, limiting their food to bread and water, and utilizing a form of 
punishment known as “the greasy pole.”88 
This method of punishment consisted of strapping girls with their 
hands tied behind them to a greasy pole from which they were partly 
suspended. Unable to keep themselves in an upright position, because 
of the grease on the pole, they slipped almost to the floor, with their 
arms all but severed from the arm sockets, suffering intense pain for 
long periods of time.89 
Exploiting the integrated nature of the workhouse and pre-existing 
racial tensions, prison officials also forced women of one race to brutally 
attack women of another race, threatening punishment for refusal.90 
Given the conditions at Occoquan, it should be no surprise that the 
initial sentences to the workhouse in July 1917 caused quite a stir, 
particularly given the “well-connected women” associated with the 
suffrage movement.91 The convicted suffragists included the daughter of a 
former ambassador and secretary of state, the wife of a Progressive Party 
leader, and other society figures.92 The husbands of many of the women 
“turned to [President] Wilson in outrage,” and the sentences to Occoquan 
garnered enormous press coverage.93 By July 19, 1917, President Wilson 
had issued pardons to the women.94 
Nevertheless, the women continued their picketing and more arrests 
followed.95 By August 17, 1917, local police officers arrested six more 
suffragists, each sentenced to thirty days at Occoquan.96 The arrests 
continued in the subsequent weeks, and on September 4, 1917, local 
officials arrested a group and sentenced them to sixty days at Occoquan.97 
President Wilson issued no further pardons, and the women garnered no 
special treatment in the prison, finding conditions of “poor sanitation, 
infested food, and dreadful facilities.”98 
As far as possible the women intended to abide by the routine of the 
institution, disagreeable and unreasonable as it was. They performed 
the tasks assigned to them. They ate the prison food without protest. 
They wore the coarse prison clothes. But at the end of the first week 
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of detention they became so weak from the shockingly bad food that 
they began to wonder if they could endure a diet of sour bread, half-
cooked vegetables, and rancid soup with worms in it.99 
Meanwhile, local officials, with White House support, continued to 
arrest the picketers and sentence them to longer and longer sentences.100 
The publicity of the suffragists’ incarceration, “the reports of [the] 
dreadful conditions in [the] jail,” and the resignation of a close confidant 
of President Wilson in September—a resignation made in solidarity with 
the picketers—led to “unprecedented demonstrations of support in 
Congress.”101 By September 14, 1917, one month after the second large 
set of prisoners arrived at Occoquan, Senator Andrieus A. Jones, the Chair 
of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, visited Occoquan.102 One 
day later, the House of Representatives reported the Nineteenth 
Amendment out of committee.103 
As it became clear that the arrests would continue, the women would 
receive longer and longer sentences, and the publicity garnered by the 
arrests put pressure on Congress, the suffragists moved their protest inside 
prison walls.104 Claiming to be political prisoners, the women sought to 
intensify the pressure the picketing placed on the Wilson Administration 
by highlighting the injustice of their plight.105 The women began 
circulating a petition within Occoquan—”the first organized group action 
ever made in America to establish the status of political prisoners.”106 
Catching wind of the petition, prison officials moved many women to 
solitary confinement.107 The petition demanded (1) that the suffragists be 
treated as political prisoners; (2) that the suffragists be allowed to 
congregate together and all be released from solitary confinement; (3) that 
the suffragists be afforded the opportunity to meet with their lawyers; (4) 
that the suffragists be allowed to receive food from the outside; and (5) 
that the suffragists be provided writing material and books, letters, and 
newspapers.108 
In the petition, the suffragists also highlighted the horrid conditions 
within Occoquan, stating that they did not immediately create the petition 
“because on entering the workhouse [they] found conditions so very bad 
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that before [they] could ask that the suffragists be treated as political 
prisoners, it was necessary to make a stand for the ordinary rights of 
human beings for all the [prisoners].”109 After garnering signatures for the 
petition, the suffragists smuggled it out of Occoquan for delivery to the 
commissions of the District of Columbia.110 In addition to the petition, the 
suffragist prisoners also announced a prison work strike.111 
Rather than respond in any meaningful way, prison officials and 
district commissioners transferred the signatories out of Occoquan to the 
District Jail, placing each in solitary confinement.112 Conditions at the 
District Jail proved no better than conditions at Occoquan: built in the 
1870s, the jail’s cells measured six-by-nine feet, so small that the women 
could touch each side with their fingerprints, arms outstretched.113 The tiny 
cells were infested with vermin, including rats and bed bugs, and each cell 
contained an open toilet, which, when combined with the prison’s practice 
of closing the windows from the late afternoon until morning, created a 
stifling environment with no fresh air.114 The windows in the cells locked, 
and jail officials punished any woman who attempted to open a window.115 
The jail served food no more palatable than the food at Occoquan, and the 
women survived on bread, water, and molasses (occasionally provided by 
jail officials).116 
In protest of these conditions and the suffragists’ placement in 
solitary confinement, Alice Paul, who had been arrested on October 20, 
1917, and sentenced to seven months, began a hunger strike, drawing on 
the lessons learned during her years working with the Pankhursts.117 To 
Ms. Paul and the others who joined her, the hunger strike was “the ultimate 
form of protest left.”118 Rather than heed the demands of the suffragists, 
however, the jail administrators began force-feeding the hunger strikers.119 
In response to the force-feeding, suffragists on the outside increased 
the number of picketers at the White House gates.120 This increase led to 
the largest arrest of picketers participating in the protest campaign. On 
November 11, 1917, officials arrested forty-one Silent Sentinels.121 After 
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conviction, the women arrived at Occoquan on November 15, 1917, 
ushering in what suffragists would later call the “Night of Terror.”122 From 
the moment the women arrived at the prison, prison officials subjected 
them to rough man-handling and physical beatings.123 Prison officials 
threw the women into dark, dirty cells with iron beds and open toilets that 
flushed only from the outside.124 Throughout the night, the women 
experienced “forced stripping, physical violence, shackling with manacles 
to prison bars, and threatened use of straightjackets and gags.”125 Prison 
officials provided the women with no food for almost twenty-four hours 
and denied the women visitation with their attorney and family 
members.126 Many of the women immediately began a hunger strike.127 In 
an effort to break the will and morale of the hunger strikers, the Occoquan 
officials isolated them from one another, interrogated them, informed 
them that no one from the outside cared about their plight, lied to them 
that their attorney quit fighting for their case and cause, and instructed 
them that their compatriots had given up the fight.128 The women 
“suspected the lies and remained strong in their resistance.”129 
Eventually able to consult with their lawyer, the women filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that their confinement at 
Occoquan was illegal because Occoquan fell outside the territorial 
confines of the District of Columbia, where they had been convicted and 
ordered to serve their sentences.130 They also argued that their sentencing 
papers authorizing imprisonment as punishment indicated they should be 
confined in the District Jail.131 On November 23, 1917, Judge Edmund 
Waddill of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia held a hearing on the writ petition.132 The women filed into the 
courtroom looking “haggard, red-eyed, and sick,” some too weak to walk 
to their seats and some bearing “the marks of the attack on the ‘night of 
terror.’”133 Judge Waddill, “alarmed by the writ’s description of the 
women’s treatment, calling it ‘bloodcurdling’ if true,” granted the 
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petition.134 The judge found “that the suffragists had been illegally 
imprisoned at Occoquan (rather than the District Jail) and that they could 
be paroled on bail or finish their terms at the District Jail.”135 In a show of 
solidarity with the women already serving sentences in the jail, twenty-
two women chose to finish their sentences and joined the hunger strike 
already in progress when they arrived.136 Faced with thirty hunger-striking 
women, the jail released all of the women on November 27 and 28, 
1917.137 By March 4, 1918, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated 
the women’s convictions.138 
Thereafter, as congressional momentum built behind the passage of 
the Nineteenth Amendment, the women paused their picketing for a short 
while.139 On January 10, 1918, “exactly forty years to a day from the time 
the suffrage amendment was first introduced into Congress and exactly 
one year to a day from the time the first picket banner appeared at the gate 
of the White House,” the House of Representatives passed the Nineteenth 
Amendment.140 However, when it became clear that the Senate would stall 
the Amendment’s passage, the women again gathered at Lafayette 
Monument, directly across from the White House, with their banners in 
tow on August 6, 1918.141 District officials arrested forty-eight women at 
the protest, charged them with and convicted them of “holding a meeting 
in public grounds” and “climbing a statue,” and sentenced them to ten (for 
holding a public meeting) or fifteen (for climbing a statue) days.142 
District officials transported twenty-six of these women to an 
abandoned building that used to serve as a men’s workhouse until it “ha[d] 
been declared unfit for human habitation in 1909.”143 
This place was the worst the women had experienced. Hideous 
aspects which had not been encountered in the workhouse and jail 
were encountered here. The cells were damp and cold. The doors 
were partly of solid steel with only a small section grating, so that a 
very tiny amount of light penetrated the cells. The cots were of iron, 
without any spring and with only a thin straw pallet to lie upon. So 
frightful were the nauseating odors which permeated the place, and 
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so terrible was the drinking water from the disused pipes, that one 
prisoner after another became violently ill.144 
Picking up right where they left off during their last prison stint, the 
suffragists immediately restarted their protests: all but two very elderly 
women declared a hunger strike upon arrival.145 Within five days, district 
officials once again released the women early, prior to the completion of 
their sentences.146 
In the months that followed, the women’s protests continued, and the 
district police made periodic arrests.147 With each arrest, conviction, and 
sentence, the women continued their practice of hunger striking in 
prison.148 While their in-prison petitioning and protests advanced their 
cause, it also brought attention, albeit limited, to the conditions of 
confinement at Occoquan and the District Jail.149 The suffragists’ press 
coverage eventually led to a congressional investigation into the 
conditions at Occoquan and, “after receiving one too many protest letters 
about the suffragists plight,” President Wilson requested an inquiry into 
Occoquan’s conditions.150 While the President’s secretary, and right-hand 
man, confirmed the women’s poor treatment, the President rejected his 
opinion, instead tasking a district commission with the assignment of 
preparing an investigative report on conditions.151 The commissioners “did 
little more than interview the prison officials,” and the report ultimately 
kowtowed to political pressure.152 However, the inquiry nonetheless 
brought a small amount of transparency to the prison that had theretofore 
been lacking.153 
The suffragists’ in-prison protest strategies are often replicated by 
prisoners in the modern American carceral state. Yet, much like the 
suffragists’ experience, today’s prisoners often face extreme punishment 
and retaliation for protest activities like petitioning and striking, 
particularly when the prisoners attempt to engage in any form of group 
protest. Prison officials mete out such punishment and retaliation with 
impunity largely because of the deference afforded to prison officials 
under modern First Amendment doctrine as applied to prisoners. The next 
section discusses this doctrine and its attendant deference. 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRISONER PETITION AND 
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS 
Among other rights,154 the First Amendment protects “the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”155 These rights are severely restricted and essentially non-
existent in prison. While there are obvious and valid reasons to exclude 
gang membership from constitutional protections,156 prisoner membership 
in other groups, both formal and informal, is also often excluded from 
constitutional protection.157 Most importantly, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 
Inc.,158 prison officials have unfettered discretion to ban prisoner 
organizations that oppose or criticize prison policies. Moreover, even 
when a prison system allows a prisoner organization to exist, the prison 
may restrict the activities of those organizations whenever it sees fit with 
little to no judicial oversight.159 
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While the group associational rights of prisoners are unequivocally 
limited, the status of prisoners’ right to petition is not as clear. Some courts 
have found that a prisoner’s right to petition is a protected right,160 while 
others allow prison systems to restrict or ban prisoner petitions.161 The 
ambivalence of the federal courts regarding a prisoner’s right to petition 
runs contrary to the historical importance of the right to petition as a 
crucial means of redress for the disenfranchised.162 Regarded as “among 
the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,”163  
the right to petition has long-been used by groups with little to no  
political power as a way to participate in democracy.164 For example, 
historically, prisoners have been able to use the right to petition to  
instigate legislative investigations into prison conditions.165 However,  
as discussed in detail below, prisoners’ right to petition is significantly 
curtailed today. Before turning to that discussion, we must first  
examine why prisoners’ associational rights are so curtailed and the 
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deference afforded to prison officials in relation to all infringements on 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 
A. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. 
For more than a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
American federal courts refused to entertain claims challenging prison 
conditions.166 Federal courts remained steadfastly unwilling to interfere in 
the internal management of prisons by using an approach that later became 
known as the “hands-off” doctrine.167 This doctrinal approach to prisoners’ 
constitutional rights changed, however, in the late nineteen sixties and 
early nineteen seventies when prisoners began organizing in protest of the 
institutional conditions of the prisons that confined them.168 
While the courts began recognizing the enforceability of certain 
constitutional rights for prisoners, American politics began to sharply shift 
focus “to maintaining civic order and fighting crime.”169 In reaction to  
this wave of prisoner activism, prison systems began to expend  
enormous effort trying to limit prisoners’ ability to meet and organize 
within prison walls: 
They attempted to ban meetings of [prisoners] within prisons. They 
tried to forbid the sending or receiving of union-related material 
through the prison mail system. They also singled out specific 
prisoner labor leaders for time in segregation. However, the biggest 
thorn in their side was [prisoner] claims to the right to unionize. If 
[prisoners] could join a union, then they would have rights. If they 
had rights, then prison officials would no longer have carte blanche 
to extract prisoners’ labor as they saw fit.170 
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Prison officials’ efforts to quell prisoner organizing and protest 
activities culminated in the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union.171 
Jones concerned the activities of the North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor 
Union (NCPLU), founded in 1974 to 
secure meaningful rehabilitation programs, to defend human and civil 
rights of prisoners, to arrange for community based support groups 
to appear before legislative bodies in the interests of prison reform, 
to educate the public through the publication of a union newspaper 
and through news releases, to retain attorneys for the protection of 
prisoners’ legal rights, and for the advancement of prisoners’ 
economic, political, social, and cultural interests.172 
By the time the Jones case reached the Supreme Court, the NCPLU 
had approximately 2,200 members living in forty different correctional 
institutions across the state of North Carolina.173 The organization took 
pride in its multi-racial composition, and its Board of Directors included 
“seven white persons, six black persons and one American Indian.”174 
In reaction to the formation of the NCPLU,175 North Carolina prison 
officials promulgated an administrative regulation that (1) prohibited 
prisoners from soliciting others to join a prisoner union, (2) prohibited any 
prisoner union from using North Carolina Department of Correction 
property, (3) called for the permanent exclusion of any person entering a 
correctional unit with the purpose of organizing, and (4) prohibited 
correctional officers from negotiating with any prisoner union.176 Pursuant 
to this regulation, prison officials took several actions that interfered with 
the operation of the NCPLU.177 First, prison officials censored any 
incoming mail, whether sent by prisoners or non-prisoners, that related to 
solicitation of union members.178 Second, prison officials censored the 
NCPLU’s bi-monthly newsletter, preventing its introduction into any 
North Carolina prison by disposing of it or returning it to the sender.179 
 
 171. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 172. Brief for Appellee at 5, Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
(No. 75-1874), 1976 WL 181714, at *7. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Notably, despite legally incorporating as a labor union under the auspices of the Secretary 
of State of North Carolina, the NCPLU expressly disclaimed any intention to operate as a true labor 
union as defined by the National Labor Relations Act. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 
F. Supp. 937, 940 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 1977). 
 176. Jones, Brief for Appellee, supra note 172, at *8. 
 177. Id. at *8–10. 
 178. Id. at *9. 
 179. Id. at *9–10. 
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Finally, prison officials barred paralegals employed by the NCPLU’s 
attorneys from visiting the prisoners.180 
The NCPLU filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina in early 1975, claiming defendant prison 
officials violated “its rights and the rights of its members to engage in 
speech, press, association and assembly activities protected by the First 
Amendment” by enacting and enforcing the above regulation.181 In 
defense of its infringement on the NCPLU’s rights, North Carolina prison 
officials asserted four reasons why its restrictions were lawful.182 First, 
prison officials claimed the NCPLU may create “a divisive element” 
amongst the prisoner population.183 Second, prison officials speculated 
that the individual prisoner organizers may become “power figures” 
among the incarcerated population.184 Third, prison officials discounted 
the need for an organization like the NCPLU, reasoning that the Inmate 
Grievance Commission provides prisoners a forum for “airing their 
complaints.”185 Finally, prison officials feared “work stoppages and 
mutinies, riots, and chaos could result” in allowing the NCPLU to continue 
its operations.186 The NCPLU responded to these concerns by asserting 
that the “apprehensions were all of a speculative nature” and that prison 
officials could point to no “facts derived from the six preceding months of 
Union activity within the North Carolina correctional system, or to 
experiences in the prison systems of other jurisdictions, which lent any 
support to their fears.”187 
On March 26, 1975, the Eastern District of North Carolina certified 
a three-judge district court panel to determine the constitutionality of the 
regulation.188 Almost a year later, on March 16, 1976, the three-judge 
panel held the regulation unconstitutional and entered a judgment in favor 
of the NCPLU.189 The North Carolina prison officials sought review of the 
district court’s judgment in the Supreme Court.190 
 
 180. Id. at *10. 
 181. Id. at *4. 
 182. Id. at *10–11. 
 183. Id. at *10. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *10–11. 
 186. Id. at *11. 
 187. Id. at *11. 
 188. Id. at *5. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at *2. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any appeal “from an 
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any 
civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a 
district court of three judges.” 
2020] "Inciting a Riot" 1135 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, upholding the prison 
officials’ ban on solicitation for union meetings and membership.191 In 
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court stressed that the prisoners’ 
“First Amendment associational rights . . . must give way to the 
reasonable considerations of penal management.”192 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court noted the realities of prison life significantly curtail 
and necessitate restrictions on prisoners’ right to associate.193 Importantly, 
however, the Court stressed the need to defer to the discretion of prison 
officials who determined that “the presence, perhaps even the objectives, 
of a prisoners’ labor union would be detrimental to order and security in 
the prisons.”194 The Court reached this conclusion despite the paucity of 
evidence supporting the prison officials’ conclusions that “work 
slowdowns or stoppages or other undesirable concerted activity” would 
result from the NCPLU’s existence.195 By ignoring this clear lack of 
evidence, the Supreme Court ushered in an era of blind deference to prison 
officials that allows for frequent and consistent infringement of the First 
Amendment rights of prisoners.196 That deference inhibits prisoners’ 
ability to protest in the manner of the suffragists’ prisoners because such 
protest activity will inevitably lead to further punishment. 
B. The Flaws of Deference to Prison Officials 
The deference accorded the prison officials in Jones has proved the 
rule rather than the exception in the decades since the Supreme Court 
issued its decision.197 While the Supreme Court ostensibly promises 
prisoners that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating”198 them 
 
 191. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 133 (1977). 
 192. Id. at 132. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (emphasis added). Please recall that the so-called detrimental objectives of the NCPLU 
included the following: 
secure meaningful rehabilitation programs, to defend human and civil rights of prisoners, 
to arrange for community based support groups to appear before legislative bodies in the 
interests of prison reform, to educate the public through the publication of a union 
newspaper and through news releases, to retain attorneys for the protection of prisoners’ 
legal rights, and for the advancement of prisoners’ economic, political, social, and cultural 
interests. 
Jones, Brief for Appellee, supra note 172, at *7. 
 195. Jones, 433 U.S. at 123 (quoting N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 
937, 942 (E.D.N.C. 1976)); see also id. at 124 (finding “not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that 
the Union had been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions”). 
 196. Id. at 141–43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Jones majority’s blind deference to 
the North Carolina prison officials and failure to account for the credibility assessment conducted by 
the three-judge panel in the district court). 
 197. See Godfrey, supra note 8, at 337–41. 
 198. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
84 (1987)). 
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from constitutional protections, First Amendment doctrine now formally 
incorporates the deference afforded in Jones into the test utilized to 
determine whether a prison regulation violates a prisoner’s First 
Amendment rights.199 In a companion piece to this Article, I fully 
catalogue the myriad criticisms lodged against this doctrine of deference, 
and I need not fully repeat that catalog here.200 Rather, I pause only to 
highlight those criticisms particular to my focus on the importance of 
protecting prisoner rights to association and petition (i.e., those criticisms 
most relevant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Jones). 
First, the Jones Court accepted the prison officials’ argument that the 
NCPLU’s existence and objectives undermined the good order and 
security of the prison without consideration of any evidence to the 
contrary.201 In fact, the Jones Court shifted the burden to the prisoners to 
“conclusively” demonstrate the fallacy in the prison officials’ position.202 
But in crediting the prison officials’ opinions that the NCPLU’s existence 
and objective might undermine prison security, the Supreme Court ignored 
the fact-finding conclusions of the three-judge panel, which found “not 
one scintilla of evidence that the [NCPLU] had been utilized to disrupt the 
operation of the penal institutions.”203 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
decision ignored the contemporary acknowledgement by some prison 
administrators that the recognition and support of prisoner groups actually 
helps stabilize the prison environment.204 For example, in the early 1970s, 
prison officials in Washington allowed prisoners at the Washington State 
Penitentiary in Walla Walla “to elect a council with authority to 
 
 199. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85 (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking 
that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within 
the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, 
moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of 
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal 
courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”) The 
Turner Court expressly emphasized that the four-part test it articulated was driven by its perceived 
need to defer to the judgment of prison officials. Id. at 89–91 (articulating the four factors). 
 200. See generally Godfrey, supra note 8, at 342–45. 
 201. See Jones, 433 U.S. at 132. 
 202. Id.; see also Clay Calvert & Kara Carnley Murrhee, Big Censorship in the Big House—A 
Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: Muting Movies, Music & Books Behind Bars, 7 Nw. J.L. & 
POL’Y 257, 294 (2012) (quoting Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A 
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1635, 1659 (2007)) (criticizing the burden shifting inherent in the Turner doctrine). 
 203. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 944 (E.D.N.C. 1976). 
 204. See Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison 
Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 64 (1987) (recognizing that while 
“underground” prisoner groups, like gangs, may increase tension within the prison, the act of granting 
certain groups legitimacy may, in fact, “contribute to the prison’s stability” by giving voice to the 
voiceless prisoner population). 
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recommend new programs to the administration.”205 The move to 
recognize and grant some power to prisoner-run organizations created an 
immediate and obvious transformation within the prison.206 Prisoners used 
their newfound political clout to both push for revolutionary and personal 
interests—“[a] single manifesto might demand both Black Power and a 
new drama class.”207 
Of course, it is unlikely the Jones Court had the advantage of record 
evidence of situations where prison systems successfully recognized 
prisoner groups like the prisoner council in Walla Walla.208 Nevertheless, 
the Court’s reflexive deference to the North Carolina prison officials’ 
rationale without due consideration of evidence to the contrary reveals an 
inherent flaw in the doctrinal deference found in prisoners’ First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Second, as the Jones dissent aptly points out, the Jones Court’s 
deference to North Carolina prison officials abdicated the solemn duty of 
the federal courts to evaluate evidence presented and “reach an 
independent judgment.”209 In prisoners’ rights’ cases, the abdication of 
this duty becomes even more critical because of the authoritarian nature 
of prison institutions.210 Leaving prison officials to their own unfettered 
discretion runs the risk of allowing those officials’ proper exercise of state 
power to convert to “its most brutal form,” where that power looks like 
tyranny.211 Indeed, certain members of the Supreme Court have 
recognized that “careless invocations of ‘deference’” will often result in a 
return to the “hands-off” doctrine, wherein the “judicial blind eye” resulted 
in “barbarism and squalor” in many prisons.212 By incorporating deference 
to prison officials into First Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
all but eradicated the check on institutional tyranny created by the threat 
of judicial review.213 
 
 205. Id. at 65. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Cf. Jones, 433 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting ABA Joint Committee on the 
Legal Status of Prisoners, The Legal Status of Prisoners (Tent. Draft 1977), in 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
377, 419 (1977)) (recognizing that “groups feared by the prisons in the 1960s have become stabilizing 
influences in the 1970s”). 
 209. Id. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 210. See Erwin Chemerinksy, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 441, 458 (1999) (noting that prisons, by their very nature, are the “places where serious abuses 
of power and violations of rights are likely to occur”); Willens, supra note 204, at 69 (noting that the 
“authoritarian prison has historical roots in the slave plantation”). 
 211. Willens, supra note 204, at 71. 
 212. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 213. Willens, supra note 204, at 98–99. 
When prisoners are defined as brutal, hardened criminal, attacks on their humanity are 
easily ignored. When prison is defined as inherently dangerous and violent, attempts to 
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Finally, the Jones Court’s deference fails to appreciate the 
democratic value inherent in allowing prisoners to voice their collective 
concerns.214 While the federal courts have expressly recognized that the 
integrity of our criminal justice system is a matter of public concern,215 the 
Supreme Court has declined to ensure that the voices of those most 
impacted by the criminal justice system—the 2.2 million men and women 
incarcerated within that system—are heard. By allowing prison officials 
to curtail prisoner associational and petition rights with little to no 
oversight, the Supreme Court has almost completely eradicated the few 
democratic processes available to the disenfranchised. Those democratic 
processes include the ability to petition those in power to correct 
unchecked abuse216 and the ability to seek redress in the courts.217 By 
weakening prisoners’ associational rights, the Supreme Court not only 
limited the ability of prisoners to successfully litigate First Amendment 
claims but also limited their ability to attract the attention of lawyers 
whose “presence and relentless demand for information” might increase 
accountability of prison systems.218 
Judicial deference to prison officials on issues involving the 
curtailment of prisoners’ associational and petition rights undoubtedly 
contributes to the lack of transparency and accountability inherent to the 
modern American prison system.219 But the example of the protests staged 
 
maintain institutional security which are themselves dangerous and violent are easily 
justified. Both of these definitions have been essential to the legitimation of the new legal 
prison. The new prison in turn legitimates attacks on the prisoner, attacks on his space, his 
property, his body, and his pride. This prison is the paradigm of an irrational society: driven 
by fear and violence under the rhetoric of law and order, built for custody and domination 
in the name of freedom and democracy. The irrational society legitimates itself by 
rationalizing insane facts. The legitimation works, until finally it becomes irrational to say 
the obvious: something must be wrong when society asks its citizens to bend over and 
spread their legs so that society may inspect. 
Id. at 133–34. 
 214. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 164, at 2155–56 (recognizing the centrality of the Petition 
Clause to “the relationship between the governed and the government”); see also Borough of Duryea 
v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 396–97 (2011) (observing the importance of petitioning for “groups 
excluded from the franchise”). 
 215. See Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 216. See Mark, supra note 164, at 2182 (noting that “[p]etitioning provided not just a method 
whereby individuals within [disenfranchised] groups might seek reversal of harsh treatments by public 
authority, judicial or otherwise, but also a method whereby such individuals could seek the 
employment of public power to redress private wrongs that did not fit neatly into categories of action 
giving rise to a lawsuit. . . . That such power might reside in the hands of those with little, or no, other 
formal political power greatly heightens the constitutional significance of the right”). 
 217. See Willens, supra note 204, at 67 n.140 (recognizing the role litigation plays in 
“increas[ing] the visibility of prisons and the dialogue about them”). 
 218. Id. at 66–67 (noting that the existence of prisoners’ groups allowed those groups to garner 
the attention of outside community leaders, which “brought reformers into the prisons”). 
 219. See Gibbons & deBelleville Katzenbach, supra note 21, at 408–10. 
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by the suffragist prisoners demonstrates why protecting these rights for 
prisoners is important, not only to ensure appropriate accountability in the 
criminal justice system but also to honor the importance of these rights, 
even for the incarcerated. However, under current doctrine, prison officials 
are free to act with impunity in punishing prisoners for attempting to 
expose unlawful or inhumane prison conditions. As such, current doctrine 
disserves the values embodied by the First Amendment. 
III. IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING PRISONER ASSOCIATIONAL  
AND PETITION RIGHTS 
As the suffragists’ in-prison protests demonstrate, allowing prisoners 
to organize peacefully and to inform the public and those in power of 
injustices occurring inside prison walls can have a profound impact on 
public opinion and may ultimately lead to necessary social change.  
But most modern American prison systems have enacted rules  
that outright forbid any protest activity meant to draw attention to  
unjust prison conditions.220 At minimum, these rules certainly  
discourage prisoner participation in protest activity because of the harsh 
punishments associated with rules violations.221 Unfortunately, prison 
systems remain emboldened to promulgate, maintain, and enforce these 
rules because of the lack of serious judicial oversight under current First 
Amendment doctrine.222 
By limiting prisoners’ ability to engage in collective protest, prison 
systems maintain the veil of secrecy that surrounds the American prison.223 
While some prisoners may be lucky enough to catch the attention of a 
lawyer for assistance in redressing constitutional violations, lawyers may 
be reluctant to advise or allow their clients to engage in the type of civil 
disobedience practiced by the suffragists.224 But practices of peaceful 
 
 220. See infra Section III.A. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked up, Shut up: Why Speech in Prison Matters, 92 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 8 (2018). 
Prison officials appear to have received the message that they enjoy “practical immunity” 
from First Amendment lawsuits by prisoners due to a combination of Turner deference, 
other legal obstacles that stand in the way of successful prisoner action (such as 
administrative exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act), and non-legal 
impediments (such as limited education, poverty, and the difficulty of obtaining counsel). 
The prison censors carry on with impunity. As one of us has argued previously and at 
greater length, “anything goes” seems to be the attitude of prison officials who have been 
liberated from serious judicial oversight. 
Id. 
 223. See Dewan, supra note 15. 
 224. Cf. Charles R. DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good Order: An Argument for Allowing Lawyers 
to Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L. REV. 109, 110 (1982) (encouraging the legal profession 
to “recognize the importance of civil disobedience in creating changes in law and public policy”); see 
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disruption may be the best way for prisoners to educate the public on what 
is happening inside the public institutions that comprise the American 
prison system.225 And a strong public response to unfair or illegal prison 
policies is almost always enormously useful in getting those polices 
rescinded or amended.226 This is particularly true in situations where the 
policies are more the result of implicit (or explicit) biases on the part of 
prison officials rather than actual issues of prison safety.227 Some 
examples of these types of policies are discussed in the next section. 
A. “Inciting a Riot” 
A nationwide review of prison policies reveals that almost every state 
prison system has a disciplinary rule prohibiting the type of non-violent 
protest engaged in by the suffragists at Occoquan and in the D.C. jail. 
Many prison systems name these prison disciplinary charges “inciting a 
riot” or some variation thereof.228 While some of these charges seem to be 
 
also id. at 132 (noting the lack of equal access to lawyers and the legal system for some groups and 
reiterating that “social change does not occur solely with the aid of lawyers, courts, and judges”). 
 225. JAMES TAGER, LITERATURE LOCKED UP: HOW PRISON BOOK RESTRICTION POLICIES 
CONSTITUTE THE NATION’S LARGEST BOOK BAN 10 (2019), https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/09/literature-locked-up-report-9.24.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5R-8PM6] (acknowledging that 
“it may take months or even years for the general public to even learn about” certain prison policies 
because of the secrecy surrounding prison policy promulgation). 
 226. Id. (“Prisons and jails get away with a lot of what they do just because people aren’t 
watching. These are closed institutions, and they house politically powerless and unpopular people. 
So when you can get public attention, the prison system is often exposed as a paper tiger. Not every 
time, but often enough.” (quoting David Fathi, who leads the American Civil Liberties’ Union’s 
National Prison Project)). 
 227. See, e.g., id. at 5 (describing “bans on literature that discusses civil rights, historical abuses 
within America’s prisons, or criticism of the prison system itself, often on the grounds that such titles 
advocate disruption of the prisoner’s social order”). 
 228. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3005(d)(2) (2008) (prohibiting prisoners from 
participating in or urging others from participating in “a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly”); COLO. 
DEP’T OF CORR., ADMIN. REG. 150-01, CODE OF PENAL DISCIPLINE, at § IV.E.14 (“Advocating or 
Creating a Facility Disruption”); DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., HOWARD R. YOUNG CORR. INST., INMATE 
HANDBOOK 8 (“Inciting a Riot”); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-601.314(2-2) (2014) (“Inciting or 
attempting to incite riots, strikes, mutinous acts, or disturbances”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-3-21.C-
2A (2009) (prohibiting “planning, conspiring or encouraging others to participate in any group 
demonstration, disturbance, riot, strike, refusal to work, work stoppage, or work slowdown”); HAW. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CORR. ADMIN., POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, POLICY NO. COR. 13.03, 
ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURES GOVERNING SERIOUS MISCONDUCT VIOLATIONS AND THE ADJUSTMENT 
OF MINOR MISCONDUCT VIOLATIONS, at 5.0.2.a.6(11),(12); IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., STANDARD 
OPERATING PROCEDURE, DUAL DIVISION, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, CONTROL NO. 318.02.01.001, 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES: OFFENDER, at Appendix A.2 (defining “group disobedience” as 
“[p]articipation in a work stoppage, demonstration, or group disobedience that does not result in 
property damage or injury where participation is forced or coerced by other inmates”); ILL. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 20, § 504.App.A.205 (2017) (forbidding participation in “unauthorized organizational 
activities,” including meetings); IND. DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT DISCIPLINARY PROCESS, APPENDIX I: 
OFFENSES 208 (forbidding participation in “unauthorized organizational activities,” including 
meetings); IOWA DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER RULEBOOK, at E.27 (making any “obstructive” or 
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more explicitly tied to violence,229 the elements of others can clearly be 
met by merely engaging in any type of organized disobedience, regardless 
of whether such disobedience involves violence.230 At least one state has 
even criminalized “organized disobedience” within a correctional 
 
“disruptive” conduct a disciplinary offense, including “participating in unauthorized meetings, 
gatherings, or petitioning” and “encouraging others to refuse to work or participate in work stoppage”); 
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-12-319 (2007) (prohibiting “disruptive behavior”); KY. CORR., POLICIES & 
PROCEDURES, POLICY NO. 15.2, RULE VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES 9 (“inciting to riot or rioting”); 
LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., DISCIPLINARY RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR ADULT 
OFFENDERS, at VIII.29 (prohibiting “disturbances”); 03-201-10 ME. CODE R. § 20.1(VI) (PROCEDURE 
E) (LexisNexis 2013) (including “demonstration,” which prohibits group demonstrations); MICH. 
DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 03.03.105, PRISONER DISCIPLINE, at Attachment A (Code 
022 violation includes “joining others in an unauthorized work stoppage”); MONT. STATE PRISON, 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE, PROCEDURE 3.4.1, INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE, at Major Rule Infractions 
4013 (“rioting or encouraging others to riot”); NEV. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMIN. REG. 707, INMATE 
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS, at 707.02.5.MJ27 & 28 (prohibiting rioting and “[o]rganizing, encouraging 
or participating in a work stoppage or other disruptive demonstration or practice”); N.H. DEP’T OF 
CORR., POLICY AND PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE, ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, STATEMENT NO. 5.25, 
PROCESSING SPOT, DISCIPLINARY, INCIDENT & INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, at Disciplinary Rule 
Infractions 21.A (prohibiting participation in any group demonstration, strike, or work stoppage or 
slowdown); N.M. CORR. DEP’T, CD-090100, INMATE DISCIPLINE, at Category “A” Offenses A(9) & 
A(10) (prohibiting inciting a riot); R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY AND PROCEDURE, POLICY NO. 11.01-
5 DOC, CODE OF INMATE DISCIPLINE, at Discipline Severity Scale P13 (inciting others to riot); S.D. 
DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE LIVING GUIDE 16 (prohibiting engaging in a group demonstration or group 
food or hunger strike), 18 (prohibiting “circulating or signing a petition”); TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., 
INMATE RULES AND REGULATIONS 41 (prohibiting participation in or encouragement of an 
“institutional disturbance”); TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., CORR. INST. DIV., DISCIPLINARY RULES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR OFFENDERS, at Attachment A (prohibiting participation in a riot); VT. AGENCY OF 
HUMAN SERV., DEP’T OF CORR., SECURITY AND SUPERVISION #410.01, FACILITY RULES AND INMATE 
DISCIPLINE, at Attachment 1 (Major “A” Violations) (2012) (prohibiting work strikes and hunger 
strikes); VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE NO. 861.1, OFFENDER DISCIPLINE, 
INSTITUTIONS, at V.A.103 (inciting a riot). 
 229. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3005(d)(2) (2008) (limiting violation to instances 
where the circumstances “produce a clear and present and immediate danger of acts of force or 
violence”); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-12-319 (2007) (limiting a “riot” to those situations where a “use 
of force or violence occurs”); LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., DISCIPLINARY RULES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR ADULT OFFENDERS, at VIII.29 (2008) (defining “disturbances” as those instances 
“involving acts of force or violence”); MO. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER RULEBOOK 6 (prohibiting 
participating in “violent behavior that interferes with normal operations of the facility”). 
 230. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 150-01, CODE OF PENAL 
DISCIPLINE, at § IV.E.14 (“Advocating or Creating a Facility Disruption”); DEL., DEP’T OF CORR., 
HOWARD R. YOUNG CORR. INST., INMATE HANDBOOK 8 (“Inciting a Riot”); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 
r. 33-601.314(2-2) (2014) (“Inciting or attempting to incite riots, strikes, mutinous acts, or 
disturbances”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-3-21.C-2A (2009) (prohibiting the “planning, conspiring 
or encouraging others to participate in any group demonstration, disturbance, riot, strike, refusal to 
work, work stoppage, or work slowdown”); IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE, DUAL DIVISIONS, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, CONTROL NO. 318.02.01.001, 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES: OFFENDER, at Appendix A.2 (defining “group disobedience” as 
“[p]articipation in a work stoppage, demonstration, or group disobedience that does not result in 
property damage or injury where participation is forced or coerced by other inmates”). 
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institution,231 and another has a disciplinary violation for taking part in a 
“minor disturbance.”232 
While the behavior prohibited by these laws and regulations is not 
always immediately clear, many expressly prohibit the type of non-violent 
collective actions I am concerned with here. In particular, the types of 
protest I am interested in protecting are “a range of nonviolent collective 
actions by prisoners—namely work stoppages, sit-ins, spending boycotts, 
hunger strikes, and other forms of protest,”233 including petitions, that will 
allow prisoners to draw public attention to abuses and injustices occurring 
within prison walls. Importantly, these types of protest may “challenge the 
rule or order” of the prison system or “disrupt business as usual”—i.e., 
“peaceful forms of resistance” that “do not involve the threat or the use of 
force against persons or property.”234 
In urging broader protections for this type of protest, I am cognizant 
of the very real risk prison officials must address in that some of these 
protests can lead to actual riots—i.e., disturbances wherein violence 
against both prisoners and prison guards and damage to property results.235 
For that reason, I am not calling for the wholesale rescission or eradication 
of these disciplinary rules. Rather, I am calling for the judiciary to take 
seriously its role in ensuring that valid, non-violent prisoner protest 
activities meant to draw the attention of both the public and those in power 
are given proper constitutional protections. In particular, the judiciary 
must ensure the voices of those most impacted by modern criminal justice 
policies are heard in the current “national debates on mass incarceration, 
forced labor, and other injustices of our carceral state,”236 just as the 
suffragist prisoners’ voices were heard in the years leading up to the 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. To conclude this Article, I turn to 
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two examples of modern prisoner protest that have sparked or contributed 
to current conversations on criminal justice issues. 
B. Modern Prisoner Protests 
For the past several years, criminal justice reform has been the topic 
of much political debate.237 The reasons for this newfound interest in 
criminal justice reform are complex, but evolving public opinion on the 
cause and consequences of mass incarceration played a significant part.238 
Prison systems have seen reforms related to the use of solitary confinement 
and moves toward “normalization” of life inside the walls.239 Prisoners, 
cognizant of the growing conversation on prison reform, have engaged  
in various peaceful protest activities in order to draw attention to  
particular harmful prison conditions.240 I provide two examples of  
these protest activities, but for every example of a successful (or semi-
successful) prison protest, there are many others where prisoners’ protest 
activities were thwarted by prison rules, retaliation, and internal  
prison punishment.241 
An example of a prison protest that led to meaningful reforms of 
prison conditions comes out of the California prison system. In 2011 and 
2013, thousands of prisoners confined in Special Housing Units (SHUs) 
in California’s prisons engaged in a series of hunger strikes to protest the 
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brutal SHU conditions.242 The prisoners’ protest caught the attention of 
both advocates and attorneys, and in 2012, lawyers working with the 
Center for Constitutional Rights filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of 
the prisoners challenging the constitutionality of the conditions in 
California’s SHUs.243 In 2015, the case reached a landmark settlement 
ending indeterminate solitary confinement in California.244 In January 
2019, at the request of the prisoners through their attorneys, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California determined that 
the constitutional violations giving rise to the suit continued in certain 
prisons and ordered an additional year of monitoring of the settlement 
agreement.245 Thus, while the fight for humane SHU conditions continues 
in California, the prisoners’ protest activities prompted meaningful change 
and judicial oversight. 
A second example of modern prisoner protest occurred from August 
21, 2018 until September 9, 2018, when incarcerated individuals across 
the country “orchestrated a daring and seemingly improbable coordinated 
protest” by engaging in work stoppages, hunger strikes, sit-ins,  
and commissary boycotts.246 Organized through a nationwide prisoner 
organization called Jailhouse Lawyers Speak, the prisoners “sought  
to draw public attention to longstanding grievances over inhumane 
treatment within prisons across the country and to call for significant 
criminal justice reforms.”247 While public officials met none of the 
prisoners’ ten demands,248 
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the 2018 nationwide prison strike was still a remarkable event in its 
scope and coordination, as well as its ability to generate public 
support and attention. An estimated 150 different organizations 
endorsed the strike; citizens held numerous demonstrations outside 
of prisons in solidarity; and a range of national media publications 
provided detailed coverage of the protest’s motivations, objectives, 
tactics, and status as potentially the ‘largest prison strike in U.S. 
history.’249 
Joining the ranks of the prison strikes that occurred in conjunction 
with the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the 2018 prison 
strike created critical public awareness of prison conditions.250 The sheer 
enormity of the strike and the press coverage it generated demonstrate the 
effectiveness of allowing prisoners to collectively make their voices heard 
in political debates on criminal justice reform.251 This result—allowing the 
disenfranchised to be heard through protest activities protected by petition 
and associational rights—is consistent with the meaning and purpose of 
the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
By broadening the protections afforded prisoners exercising their 
petition and associational rights, federal courts entertaining the First 
Amendment claims of prisoner-plaintiffs will be providing a necessary 
 
1. Immediate improvements to the conditions of prisons and prison policies that recognized 
the humanity of imprisoned men and women. 
2. An immediate end to prison slavery. All persons imprisoned in any place of detention 
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imprisoned humans have a possibility of rehabilitation and parole. No human shall be 
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6. An immediate end to racist gang enhancement laws targeting Black and brown humans. 
7. No imprisoned human shall be denied access to rehabilitation programs at their place of 
detention because of their label as a violent offender. 
8. State prisons must be funded specifically to offer more rehabilitation services. 
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check on the operation of executive power in the prison systems.252 Like 
the suffragists, the modern American prisoner is often disenfranchised and 
lacks any political power. The First Amendment exists to ensure that the 
voice and ideas of the powerless can be asserted against the powerful.253 
In particular, the Petition Clause is meant “to codify a broad right to seek 
redress from the whole of government,”254 including redress for 
prisoners.255 Because prison systems can and do promulgate policies 
meant to entrench biases,256 and prison systems rarely have the capacity to 
self-regulate,257 it is incumbent upon the federal courts to protect 
prisoners’ right to criticize the prison system and bring to light unlawful 
and inhumane conditions.258 This is especially true because prisoners, like 
the disenfranchised women who became the Silent Sentinels,  
are a politically marginalized community who must be able “to articulate 
alternative viewpoints and play active roles in public life.”259 By  
providing a platform for such diverse viewpoints, we are able to “keep[ ] 
the state honest” and protect our democratic values and constitutional form 
of government.260 
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